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Abstract
Fiscal distress of local governments and municipalities is a non-negligible com-
ponent of the public finance turmoil after the Great Recession. In this paper we
consider a dataset of Italian municipalities over the period 2000-2012 and look for
the main budget determinants of local default. According to our results the default
probability is positively affected by the share of loan repayment over total spending.
This result is robust to alternative model specifications as well as inclusion of fixed
effects, time dummies and macroeconomic control variables.
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1 Introduction
In 2015 the Italian Government has increased from 8% to 10% the ratio between interest
spending and total current revenue that local municipalities are allowed to maintain.
This is only one of the many limits to budget variables - in addition to the balance
budget constraint - that the Government imposes in order to prevent fiscal distress in
local municipalities. To what extent those limits actually matter in preventing future
defaults?
The issue is relevant as the deterioration of public finance occurred over the last years
as a consequence of the long wave of the 2008 Financial Crisis does not involve solely state
levels but it also includes local governments and municipalities both in US and EU. The
2013 default of Detroit the largest city in US history to file for bankruptcy is probably
the most famous case, but by no means the only one. Famous episodes of fiscal distress
in US municipalities or local governments over the years include New York, Cleveland,
Miami, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, Orange County.
Fiscal distress of sub-national authorities are observed also in Europe: the most visible
episode has been Catalunia in 2012, but there have been some other significant cases in
Portugal and Italy.1 Local governments defaults can be either cause or consequence of
national public finances tensions. Particularly in the former case, it is therefore important
to understand their determinants in order to prevent negative spillovers on higher levels
of governments. It is also crucial for the policy design of fiscal constraints that national
authorities usually impose on local governments.
In this paper we empirically investigate the determinants of Italian local municipalities
default using a panel dataset from 2000 to 2012. We apply binary regression models in
the attempt to identify the most important variables leading to major fiscal distress
episodes. Our results show that the most significant budget component increasing the
probability of future default is the share of annual loan repayment over total spending.
We also find evidence that an increase in fiscal revenue diminishes the probability of
1See Dexia (2006).
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local municipalities fiscal distress; no evidence, on the other hand, is found relative to
components that are often pointed out as dangerous indicators, such as residuals of the
level of current spending.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers some review
of the relevant literature on local public finance. Section 3 presents the data set, the
specification of the empirical model and our main result. Section 4 offers some concluding
remarks.
2 Previous literature on local fiscal distress
Literature does not employ a unique definition of local fiscal distress. The definition is
often country-specific: a local government is considered to default whenever it enters the
conditions disciplined by national laws, which generally refer to the inability to fulfil its
existing financial obligations (Lobo et al., 2011). However, there have been a few attempts
to adopt a broader approach. Jones and Walker (2007) define distress as the failure of
maintaining the pre-existed level of service. Kloha et al. (2005) work out a ten-point
scale of fiscal distress, made of ten indicators: decrease in population growth, general
fund operating deficit, long-term debt as a percentage of taxable values, and so on. From
a theoretical point of view these attempts are noteworthy, as they can more thoroughly
grasp the effective conditions of distress; however they present a few problems as far as the
practical application is concerned, as they require a rigorous and time-invariant definition
of the numerical thresholds for each indicator.
There is an extensive literature focusing on single aspects of local public finance, as
potential determinants of default or at least serious deterioration of fiscal conditions. Two
issues have received most of the attention: local debt management and the dynamics of
fiscal adjustments in order to guarantee intertemporal solvency. The stock of local au-
thorities liabilities (and the associated flow of debt services) is traditionally crucial in
predicting or explaining fiscal distress. While Epple and Spatt (1986) discuss from a the-
oretical perspective the optimality and the implications of debt ceilings impositions on
local authorities, a large literature has investigated empirically how borrowing costs are
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affected by a number of factors: local governments fiscal decisions (Capeci, 1994), federal
tax rates (Metcalf, 1993), legislation on debt and deficit rules (Poterba and Rueben, 1999)
and liquidity and credit risks (Wang et al., 2008). Also the dynamics of fiscal adjustments
has received some attention. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1989) investigate the dynamic interrela-
tionship between expenditures, revenues and transfers in 171 US municipalities over the
period 1972-1980. They find that such relationship are often confined between two years;
moreover, they find that while past revenues help predict current expenditures, past levels
of spending do not alter future revenue paths. In other words they find that the intertem-
poral causal relationship goes from revenue to spending, but not viceversa. Buettner
and Wildasin (2006) tackle the same issue but focus on the timing and the modalities of
the implementation of intertemporal fiscal adjustment paths after a fall in local revenue.
They study 1270 local US municipalities over the period 1970-1997, using a vector-error
correction approach, useful to catch both long-run dynamics and their deviations from
it. Their findings particularly emphasize the role of public expenditure as ”buffer” to
preserve intertemporal solvency: an additional dollar of, alternatively, local tax revenue
and transfers gives rise to a present value increase in public spending of, respectively, 78
and 64 cents. Skidmore and Scorsone (2011) look at the reaction of local municipalities
in Michigan to declining tax revenue and state/federal transfers between 2005 and 2009.
Their results show that given expenditure categories (parks and recreation, capital, other
spending) were promptly cut in order to preserve solvency, while others (General Gov-
ernments and Public Works) were much less so. Public Safety, Health and Welfare were
found to be not responsive at all to the decline in revenue.
3 Empirical analysis
In this section we carry out the empirical analysis. First we illustrate the data source, the
descriptive statistics and our binary dependent variable (3.1); then we proceed to model
specification (3.2). After showing the main results (3.3), we implement a set of robustness
tests to check their validity (3.4).
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3.1 Data and the default indicator
Our analysis merges different source of information. The first one relies on an Italian
database for public administration from the Ministry of the Interior,2 which includes
Municipalities budget data. We consider five indicators in order to take into account
different features of local budgets, specifically: (i) principal index (=loan repayment over
total spending) (ii) current revenues index (=the logarithm of current revenue per-capita),
(iii) current spending index (=the ratio between current spending and total spending)
(iv) autonomy index (=tax revenue over current spending) (v) residual index (=positive
residuals over total revenues). Table 1 shows the main descriptive statistics. In addition
to that, we use a set of regional macroeconomic variables obtained from the National
Institute of Statistics (ISTAT): unemployment rate, per-capita GDP and inflation rate.
The purpose is to control for time-varying effects.
[Table 1 about here]
We now need to define a local default indicator which serve as our dependent variable.
We use data from the Ministry of the Interior and we build a binary default indicator D
which assumes the following values:
Di,t =
 1 when a Municipality i has financial distress in year t0 otherwise
We establish that a municipality is in financial distress when its council votes a de-
fault resolution, an event which is specifically disciplined by Italian Law. Legislation on
local defaults was introduced for the first time in 1989 (DL n.66 later converted into Law
n.144/1989) but was permanently systematized only eleven years later with the Testo
Unico degli Enti Locali (Dlgs 267/2000). It defines default as a contingency in which
municipalities have definite and liquid liabilities they cannot cope with. The procedure is
2For further details, see http://finanzalocale.interno.it/.
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the following: first, the City Council votes the default resolution, which includes the re-
port by the Audit Committee. Afterwords, within five days these documents are officially
transmitted to the Ministry of the Interior and to the local section of Accounting Judi-
ciary and then officially published into Gazzetta Ufficiale (Italian Official Journal which
includes new law and administrative acts). We focus the analysis on Municipalities that
experiences the default event, and combining the available information, our final database
riles on 32 cases of local default.
3.2 Model specification
Our goal is to investigate the probability of a local default, defined as in the previous
subsection. We therefore need a model able to deal with a binary dependent variable,
where the interest lies primarily in the response probability of the covariates included in
the specification.3 In the default probability literature, both logit and probit models have
been used to serve this purpose (see Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2009)). As a baseline,
we implement a logit model4 specified as follows:
Di,t = α + βBi,t−1 + γCr,t + τTt + i,t
where Di,t is the default indicator for municipality i at time t; α is a constant; B is
a vector of five budget indicators and C is a vector of macroeconomic variables at the
regional level r to control for time-varying effects, as specified in the previous subsection.
T are time dummies and  is the error term. In order to avoid simultaneity issues, budget
indicators are lagged at t− 1.
3.3 Results
Table 2 shows the result of the logit model as described in subsection 3.2. We first run a
bivariate regression (column 1) and then add each independent variables one by one among
3For a detail explanation of binary models, see Wooldridge (2010); a ”qualitative response models”
survey is proposed by Amemiya (1981).
4As robustness checks, we include further specifications in subsection 3.4, such as a probit model.
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the regressors. Variables are lagged to avoid simultaneity issues. In all specifications, the
debt indicator (the annual loan repayment over total spending5) is significant in affecting
the default probability: on average, a 10% increase in the principal index increases the
default probability by a percentage ranging from 2.6% to 2.9% with a peak of 4.7% in the
specification including both macroeconomic control variables and year dummies (column
7). Other than the debt indicator, we find (column 6) weak evidence, still considering
a 10% increase, of statistical significance for the current spending index (with a positive
average marginal effect of 1.2%) and for the current revenue index (-0.7%). This last effect
is confirmed also in the most complete specification (column 7), with an higher coefficient
and higher statistical significance.
[Table 2 about here]
3.4 Robustness checks
We now implement some alternative specification of the model so to test the robustness
of our main results. Table 3 shows the results of a pooled logit model (columns 1-4) and a
probit model (columns 5-8). We account for the presence of macroeconomic control vari-
ables, municipalities dummies and year dummies (all together or separately). Our result
on the importance of the principal index in affecting the default probability turns out to
be very strong: the coefficient is significant across all specifications, and the estimation of
the average marginal effects is pretty solid and consistent with our baseline model. The
most complete specification (column 8) reports a marginal effect on default probability
of 4.4% in face of a ten percent increase in loan repayment index. The importance of
adjusting on the revenue side is also confirmed, as a ten per cent increase in the current
revenue index diminishes the default probability by 2.3%-3.4% (in the most significant
specifications of the model).
Finally, we run a panel logit model with fixed effects (table 4 and 5). In these cases we
lose the quantitative dimension for the coefficient, but retain the qualitative one. Table 4
5Since there are multiple budget indicators that can signal the presence of debt sustainability, we
have run our model employing alternatively the following three indicators of debts burden: annual loan
repayment, interest paid on debt and new principal. Results do not change significantly.
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employs the very same model specification as in subsection 3.2. Table 5 includes also the
lagged values (up to t3) of most regressors. Once again, our main results are confirmed.
The only variable which is robustly significant in affecting the default probability is the
principal index, lagged one and two periods. Last period current revenue index keeps
affecting negatively the default probability, but only in the most complete specification
(with macroeconomic control variables and year dummies).
[Table 3 about here]
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
4 Conclusions
In this paper we empirically study the main determinants of Italian municipalities default
using a panel dataset over the period 2000-2012. We build a binary local default indicator
and we implement binary regression models to evaluate which budget components have
a major impact on local default. Results show that the main variable affecting positively
the default probability is the share of loan repayment over total spending, while the other
budget components do not seem to be statistically significant. This evidence support the
view that to maintain local debt under control should be a central goal for both local and
national policy makers, in order to avoid local default episodes that generate economic
and social instability.At the same time, the effectiveness of budget constraints other than
the usual balanced-budget such as limitations in particular subcategories of spending in
providing insurance against future default might be questioned.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean SD Min. Max.
Principal index 0.10 0.13 0 0.58
Current revenues index 6.69 0.38 6.06 8.43
Current spending index 0.51 0.20 0.05 0.88
Autonomy index 0.39 0.21 0.02 1
Residual index 1.52 1.74 0.13 21.88
Number of observations 416 416 416 416
Municipalities 32 32 32 32
Years 13 13 13 13
Notes: Data: 2000-2012.
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Table 4: Results Panel Logit fixed effect
Default Default Default
(1) (2) (3)
Principal index (t− 1) 10.68*** 10.48*** 9.965***
(2.470) (2.562) (2.842)
Current Revenues index (t− 1) -2.381 -4.248** -7.787***
(1.455) (1.876) (2.581)
Current spending index (t− 1) 2.045 1.587 1.944
(1.352) (1.454) (1.585)
Autonomy index (t− 1) 0.0759 -0.873 0.0575
(1.585) (1.774) (2.348)
Residual index (t− 1) -0.194 -0.208 -0.238
(0.183) (0.173) (0.183)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Macro-variables No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes
Number of observations 348 348 348
Number of groups 29 29 29
Pseudo R-squared 0.199 0.245 0.381
Log-likelihood value -57.70 -54.40 -44.58
Prob > Chi-square 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The explanatory variables are lagged (t−1) to avoid simul-
taneity issues. *** (**, *) indicates statistical significance at the 1
(5, 10) percent level.
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Table 5: Results Panel Logit fixed effects with lags
Default Default Default
(1) (2) (3)
Principal index (t− 1) 12.7*** 13.18*** 12.66***
(3.475) (3.559) (3.915)
Principal index (t− 2) 7.279** 7.624** 9.713**
(3.277) (3.416) (4.595)
Principal index (t− 3) 2.212 2.489 1.337
(3.138) (3.115) (3.754)
Current Revenues index (t− 1) -2.398 -3.724 -6.071**
(2.071) (2.417) (3.056)
Current Revenues index (t− 2) -0.689 -2.404 -3.465
(1.939) (2.272) (2.793)
Current Revenues index (t− 3) 0.538 0.352 -0.217
(1.749) (1.755) (2.406)
Current spending index (t− 1) 2.353 1.692 1.437
(1.754) (1.837) (2.116)
Autonomy index (t− 1) -0.587 -2.190 -1.058
(1.829) (2.059) (2.620)
Residual index (t− 1) -0.135 -0.182 -0.166
(0.149) (0.178) (0.196)
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Macro-variables No Yes Yes
Year dummies No No Yes
Number of observations 260 260 260
Number of groups 26 26 26
Pseudo R-squared 0.289 0.341 0.442
Log-likelihood value -42.56 -39.45 -33.43
Prob > Chi-square 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The explanatory variables are lagged (t−1) to avoid simul-
taneity issues. Further lags (t−2 and t−3) are inserted for the three
debt variables (Dα) and current revenues index (B1). *** (**, *)
indicates statistical significance at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.
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